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Abstract Controlling government is a primary focus of the politico-economic literature.
Recently, various political institutions have been analyzed from this perspective, most im-
portantly balanced budget rules, fiscal federalism, and direct democracy. However, one type
of institution has been neglected so far: elected competitors to the government. Such insti-
tutional competition between the government and an independent agency can be found at
the Swiss local level, where finance commissions compete with the government. In some
parts of Switzerland, local finance commissions can ex ante criticize government projects
and bring alternative policy proposals onto the political agenda, which are then voted on by
the citizens. Thus, they become strong competitors to the government. We econometrically
investigate this institutional setting by comparing the 26 Swiss cantons. We find the power of
the local finance commission to have an economically relevant, statistically significant and
robust negative effect on the tax burden and on public expenditures.
Keywords Political economics . Political control institution . Institutional competition .
Audit court
JEL classification: D70, H10
1. Introduction
High taxes are a heavy burden on citizens, but the resulting revenues make governing more
comfortable. Thus, there is an inborn conflict between citizens and the government over taxes
and the allocation of public funds. Political economists keep searching for more effective
institutional designs that prevent politicians from overextending taxation and public expen-
ditures. One strain of the literature has investigated how different decision making processes
empower citizens. These analyses have focused on representative-democracy (e.g. Persson
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& Tabellini, 2000; Mueller, 2003; Besley & Case, 2003), direct democracy (e.g. Matsusaka,
1995; Feld & Kirchga¨ssner, 2001; Feld & Matsusaka, 2003), as well as fiscal decentraliza-
tion in the form of federalism (e.g. Oates, 1999; Feld, Kirchga¨ssner & Schaltegger, 2003).
Another part of the literature has concentrated on constitutional rules to directly constrain
public spending, most importantly on balanced budget rules and the position of the Minister
of Finance in the budget process (e.g. von Hagen, 1991, 2002; Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Bohn
& Inman, 1996; Poterba, 1996; Schaltegger, 2002).
In this paper, we analyze a so far neglected option: institutionalized competition among
elected agencies, i.e. consciously designed, formalized, and permanent competition be-
tween government and an independently elected political unit. Both of these bodies
can make policy proposals that are then evaluated by the citizens. This type of politi-
cal competition is similar to market competition where the products of different com-
panies are in permanent competition. We presume that such institutionalized competi-
tion generates more policy alternatives, reduces information asymmetries, induces politi-
cians to cater to the preferences of the citizens, and fosters a more efficient allocation of
resources.
Although such a model might look utopian at first sight, it has existed for a long time
in Switzerland. There, at the local level, institutionalized competition between government
and independent audit units is a matter of fact. Many of these audit units have encompassing
ex ante control and amendment rights, which make them powerful competitors to the gov-
ernment. We econometrically investigate whether such institutional competition results in a
lower tax burden and less government expenditures. Our dataset consists of the 26 Swiss can-
tons (a canton is similar to a state in the U.S.). We use OLS and 2SLS models and estimate
the influence of different political institutions such as direct democracy, decentralization
as well as independent and competing agencies on the cantonal tax burden and govern-
ment spending. Based on these findings, we offer a brief outlook for future research and
applications.
Section 2 discusses the theoretical foundations of institutionalized competition in a direct
democratic environment. The following third section presents empirical evidence that sup-
ports our theoretical hypothesis. In the fourth section we note some future research questions
and conclude.
2. Institutional competition and the case of Switzerland
To our knowledge, institutionalized competition between the government and an indepen-
dent political agency has not yet been analyzed. Of course, various independent institutions
have been discussed, most prominently independent central banks (e.g. Alesina & Sum-
mers, 1993; Berger, de Haan & Eijffinger, 2001) as well as supreme courts (e.g. La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches & Shleifer, 2004; Feld & Voigt, 2003). However, in these
cases the focus has not been on competition between institutions, but on the separation of
competences. Furthermore, different forms of competition in political markets have long
been discussed. For instance, Breton and Wintrobe (1975) demonstrate in their response
to Niskanen (1967, 1971) that even in a bureaucracy competition emerges when resources
are scarce. In the “checks and balances” approach competition is a consequence of (often
intentionally created) conflicts of interest between institutions (Persson, Roland & Tabellini,
1997). The struggle between the conflicting interests, however, is resolved by consensus
between the affected bodies themselves. Another example is committees with overlapping
jurisdictions. As in the checks and balances approach, the committees mostly resolve their
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conflicting interests by cooperation (King, 1997). But obviously, resolution of conflict through
cooperation contrasts with our model of competition in which citizens decide between the
competing alternatives in a popular vote. Hence, we strictly follow the market analogy, where
consumers decide between different consumption alternatives.
In the following analysis of institutional competition, we focus on the very simple set-
ting of a direct democracy. In this simple setting the citizens elect the government as well
as a competitor to the government. In a town meeting the government presents its pol-
icy proposals for the following period, while the competitor may analyze the government
proposals and may be permitted to present its counterproposal. The citizens choose in a
majority vote between the status quo and the two competing proposals and delegate the
policy implementation to the government. The competitor has no direct influence on the
political outcome, because he has neither voting rights nor the power to implement his own
proposals. After the government has fulfilled its assignment, the competitor can evaluate
whether the government executed the task according to the law. As the two bodies compete
for the approval of their proposal, we anticipate the proposals to better reflect median voter
preferences. Thus, fruitful competition can result in policy outcomes closer to the median
preferences.
Such intense institutionalized competition can be observed at the Swiss local level in mu-
nicipalities with town meetings. In Switzerland more than 50 percent of the total population
lives in such municipalities. Citizens elect the government as well as an independent finance
commission, which can take the role of the competing political agency. The cantonal legisla-
tion on municipalities defines the basic institutional design of these finance commissions, but
still leaves the municipalities some autonomy in the de facto design. While the intra-cantonal
differences are very small, the inter-cantonal variations are important. In some cantons the
finance commission can only audit the accounts or, similar to an audit court, criticize the
government at the end of a fiscal year, i.e. ex post to all important decisions. However, in
other cantons finance commissions have encompassing ex ante audit competences as well
as proposal and amendment rights. In addition to the standard ex post audit of the accounts,
they can ex ante evaluate the budget proposal, individual investment projects, as well as the
tax rate. Moreover, they are allowed to advance concrete proposals, which are then voted
on by the citizens. Thus, they become strong competitors to the government. Depending
on cantonal legislation, finance commissions act as basic auditors, audit courts, institutional
opposition, or even as a type of ‘parallel’ government.
From a theoretical point of view, institutionalized competition has five main
implications.
1. The competitor informs citizens of financial and fiscal policy issues. This decreases infor-
mation asymmetries as well as principal-agent problems between citizens, government, and
the administration, which makes political decisions to better match the preferences of the
citizens (see Eichenberger & Serna, 1996). The benefits are the greatest, when the additional
information is provided ex ante to the decision process.
2. The competitor breaks the agenda setting monopoly of the government. Usually, the gov-
ernment or committees decide on the political agenda. Thus, they significantly affect the
political results (see e.g. Weingast & Marshall, 1988; Shepsle & Weingast, 1994). As soon
as the competitor has encompassing proposal and amendment rights, the agenda setting
monopoly of the government is broken, which diminishes the asymmetric influence of the
government.
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3. The proposals of the competitor and the government compete to win a majority of the
votes. Citizens can express their preferences on the proposals of the government and the
competitor directly via majority vote. Such direct competition is not only an effective in-
centive mechanism, but also a perfect feedback mechanism. It makes it easier for all market
participants to evaluate success. Simultaneously, the visibility of the preferences of the gen-
eral public to politicians improves. Both mechanisms tend to reinforce the intrinsic moti-
vation of politicians to pursue the public interest (if there is such a motivation, see Frey,
1997).
4. The competitor has incentives to break up political cartels. The government and the oppo-
sition parties have the same incentives when it comes to political rents. A pertinent example
is general tax cuts. Governments have no incentives to curb taxes; they would rather divert
the revenues to their supporters. Unfortunately, political competition does not help, as the
opposition parties cannot credibly commit to tax cuts, because cutting taxes will go against
their interests, as soon as they are in power themselves. The competitor, however, is far
more independent and does not have the same opportunity to extract rents from the political
process. Firstly, the competitor has no direct influence on the political results as he has no
executive powers. Therefore, he cannot directly benefit from political rents generated by,
e.g., high taxes. Secondly, we observe in the Swiss case that on average the members of
the competing institution emanate from another “selection” of politicians. Compared to a
mandate in an executive position, the competitor mandate is less time consuming, and pro-
fessional auditing know how can be transferred from the private sector to political office quite
easily. Furthermore, members of the competing institution are less likely than government
or parliament members to be career politicians and are far more often politicians only for
a short period. Thus, they are less integrated within political networks and usually do not
belong to the “classe politique”.
5. Members of the competing agency have incentives to pursue constructive policies. At first
glance, opposition parties may appear to play a role similar to the one of competing agency.
However, they have strong incentives to pursue obstructive rather than constructive strategies
for two reasons: First, political outcomes are attributed to the government rather than to
the opposition parties. Second, opposition parties that choose constructive strategies run the
risk that voters like their influence and thus do not elect them into government but rather
want to keep them in this fruitful opposition role. Thus, taking a constructive position may
worsen the electoral prospects of an opposition party. In contrast, members of the competing
unit do not compete to be elected into government. They can only boost their chances to be
reelected as competitors by pursuing constructive strategies and trying to improve political
outcomes.
These five aspects induce the competitor to propose policy alternatives that are closer
to median preferences. This, in turn, exerts competitive pressure on the government and
thus, increases its incentives to cater to the citizens’ demands. Of course, the beneficial
effects are not dependent on auditors always becoming active to the full possible extent. As
the contestable market hypothesis suggests, the incentives of the government are already
affected by the potential activity of the auditors. As a consequence, the government is less
willing to pursue policies that asymmetrically favor special interest groups. Therefore, we
hypothesize that the allocation efficiency increases with the power of the competitor, i.e.
when the competitor exhibits encompassing ex ante audit and proposal rights. We expect this
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to result in better fiscal performance as measured by lower government spending, deficits,
public debt, tax levels etc.
3. Empirical evidence at the Swiss local level
Switzerland is a federal state and has – similar to the U.S. – a much decentralized po-
litical structure. The 26 cantons (similar to U.S. states) as well as most local munici-
palities enjoy a high degree of autonomy and make a wide range of political decisions
independently. Therefore, the institutional design differs strongly across the 26 cantons.
The cantons as well as the municipalities raise their own taxes to finance cantonal and
local expenditures. These characteristics make the Swiss case particularly interesting for
empirical research (for details see, e.g., Feld & Matsusaka, 2003; Feld & Kirchga¨ssner,
2001).
3.1. The data
3.1.1. The institutional competition variable
At the local level, institutionalized competition between government and an elected competi-
tor develops in communities with town meetings, because only in this institutional setting
is the finance commission really independent. In parliamentary systems the finance com-
mission is an ordinary committee (Weingast & Marshall, 1988), with the exception of two
larger Swiss cities, i.e. Olten as well as the financially most successful city of Switzerland,
Zug. As this form of institutionalized competition has not yet been analyzed, no respective
measure exists. To measure institutional competition we construct an index that captures the
institutional design of the finance commissions in the 26 cantons. The intra-cantonal design
is relatively homogenous, whereas the inter-cantonal variation is striking. In order to identify
the de facto design, we first analyzed the (de jure) cantonal legislation on municipalities;
then we investigated whether the communities made de facto use of the opportunities offered
by cantonal law (see Schelker, 2002; Schelker & Eichenberger, 2003). In line with ordinary
supreme auditing institutions such as the US General Accounting Office, the European Court
of Auditors, or the German “Rechnungsho¨fe”,1 all local finance commissions carry out a
standard audit of the accounts, may perform an ex post evaluation of economic efficiency,
and submit an auditor’s report. The finance commissions have no authority to enforce changes
or to introduce sanctions. However, in contrast to ordinary audit courts, in many cantons the
local finance commission has, in addition to the ex post auditing rights, encompassing ex
ante control competences. They may audit and evaluate the proposed budget, individual in-
vestment projects as well as the tax rate ex ante. Furthermore, they may have extensive rights
to propose amendments to government projects. To summarize, finance commissions may
have one or more of the following competences:
1. Audit competences
• Ex post audit of the accounts
• Ex post audit of individual government projects
1 For an economic analysis of supreme audit institutions, see e.g. Frey and Serna (1990), Frey (1994), Streim
(1994), and Forte and Eusepi (1994).
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• Ex ante audit and evaluation of the government’s budget proposal
• Ex ante audit and evaluation of individual government projects
2. Amendment recommendations (to the citizens)
• Right to issue opinions and recommendations on government propositions (accep-
tance/rejection)
• Right to advance alternative propositions
3. Independence
• Elected by the citizens (not appointed by government)
The audit competences define the item to be audited and at what moment the audit takes
place (before or after execution). The “Ex post audit of the accounts” is the classical audit
procedure, where the audit unit examines the reliability of the accounts and their compli-
ance with general accounting standards. Under “Ex post audit of individual projects” the
commission audits individual projects by evaluating the effectiveness of its implementation
and identifying any misuse of public funds. Under “Ex ante audit and evaluation of budget
proposal”, the commission evaluates the budget proposal’s compliance with accounting stan-
dards. Under “Ex ante audit and evaluation of individual projects”, the commission evaluates
the efficiency of individual investment projects before they are adopted and implemented. In
order to effectively bring information into the political process, finance commissions need
to have recommendation and amendment rights. We code each aspect with 1 (available) or 0
(not available) and aggregate them to form the finance commission index. We exclude “Ex
post audit of the accounts” and “Recommendation with respect to the government proposition
(acceptance/rejection)” from our index because the finance commissions of all communities
exhibit these aspects (for details see Schelker & Eichenberger 2003). Because only munic-
ipalities with town meeting feature such competing finance commissions, we multiply the
finance commission index by the prevalence of town meetings in each canton. Thus, our
measure of institutional competition is the product of the finance commission index and
a variable measuring the fraction of people per canton living in a municipality with town
meeting (for details see Appendix B).
Note that a lack of recommendation and amendment rights does not necessarily elimi-
nate competition between the government and the finance commission. All cantons require
an auditor’s report from which interested citizens can obtain information about the finance
commission’s point of view. Therefore, relevant information may enter the political process
even though recommendation and amendment rights are missing. But in this case the infor-
mation and transaction costs must be borne by individual citizens. Thus, in a community
where the finance commission has no recommendation and amendment rights, transaction
costs are higher and information asymmetries more important than in communities where the
finance commission enjoys encompassing recommendation and amendment rights. A related
argument can be made with respect to audit competences. Even with limited audit rights,
important information may be generated. But again, transaction costs for individual citizens
are significantly higher. Hence, in communities with weak finance commissions, competition
between government and the finance commission will be less intensive and the benefits to
the citizens’ inferior. Thus, the finance commission indicator is interpreted as a measure of
intensity of competition.
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3.1.2. The dependent variables
As a consequence of the extensive decentralization of Switzerland, financial data at the mu-
nicipal level is not easily available and often not comparable across cantons. The problem is
even more serious for smaller communities, which are more likely to feature town meetings.
There is, for instance, no standardized dataset on the fiscal performance of municipalities.
Data on local public debt are only available for bigger cities whereas official data for the
other municipalities are wild estimates. Data concerning local public spending are generally
not comparable between the municipalities of different cantons. Moreover, the extent of de-
centralization varies across cantons. Thus, there is a substitution effect among municipal and
cantonal spending (see Eichenberger, 1994; Schaltegger, 2001). For both reasons, we concen-
trate on the aggregate of local and cantonal data. Reliable data exists for the aggregate of the
local and cantonal tax burden as well as public expenditures for each canton. The aggregated
tax burden is an index constructed by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office and includes the
taxes of the canton, the municipality, and the local official church communities (which have
the power to tax) on a natural person’s annual income. The data on aggregated local and
cantonal public expenditures per capita include the cantonal government expenditures and
the aggregated government expenditures from all municipalities in the same canton over
a budget period divided by the cantonal population. Unfortunately, these data also include
federal grants. Therefore, we have to eliminate the observations from the canton of Uri. A
large share of the budget of this canton consists of huge federal infrastructure projects, which
are fully funded by the federal government.
As we do not observe any significant variation in the institutional design in this period,
we focus on cross-section evidence. Consequently, our empirical analysis is limited to 26
observations. Although this is in line with many cross-country analyses, we need to be
cautious when interpreting the results. Nevertheless, the estimates look promising as we
obtain statistically significant and robust results despite the limited sample-size.
3.1.3. Control variables
Tax rates and government expenditures are driven by a broad set of variables. From a politico-
economic perspective, institutional features such as the effectiveness of direct democratic
instruments at the local and cantonal levels as well as federalism in the form of fiscal decen-
tralization must be considered. Therefore, we include various indicators for direct democracy
and federalism in our model. Direct democracy at the local level is captured by the fraction
of the population that lives in a community with town meetings. To specify the magnitude of
direct democracy at the cantonal level we use the standard index proposed by Stutzer (1999)
(see also Frey & Stutzer, 2000, 2001), which aggregates all relevant aspects of the extent
of direct democratic instruments available to citizens into a single indicator. To describe the
degree of federalism in the form of fiscal decentralization in a specific canton we use an
index proposed by Ladner (1994), which captures local autonomy as described by the local
chief administrators in a systematic survey.
Of course, it would also be interesting to control for other political variables, such as
the composition of the government and government fractionalization, which have been
found to be relevant in explaining fiscal policy in cross-country as well as in US cross-
state regressions. However, for the Swiss local level, data on the composition of the gov-
ernments is neither available nor would it be very informative. As most members of
Swiss local governments are elected on a personal basis in majority votes, all govern-
ments are fractionalized to a large extent. Moreover, many members of local governments
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are not members of a political party. Furthermore, it is difficult to compare political par-
ties across cantons as even the cantonal sections of parties with nationwide activities
largely differ between cantons, as is, e.g., evidenced in the fact that they often advance
opposing recommendations for nationwide referenda. Therefore, we did not include mea-
sures for the political position as well as the composition of the government into our
estimates.
To control for economic, topographic, demographic etc. aspects, which impact on public
spending as well as on the tax burden, we include the cantonal per capita income, the average
population size, the cantonal unemployment rate, an index measuring urbanity, an index
measuring topography, the demographic structure, and a dummy for language affiliation
(German 1, French and Italian 0).
According to the recent literature, we expect direct democratic instruments and federal-
ism to have a negative influence on the tax burden and public expenditures. For the cantonal
per capita income we anticipate a negative (positive) impact on the tax burden (spending).
For population size we have no clear-cut expectations, as there are arguments in favor of
both economies as well as diseconomies of scale. The unemployment rate can be expected
to exhibit a positive impact on the tax rate as well as public expenditures since unemploy-
ment leads to higher welfare costs. Increasing values in the topography index imply higher
topographic burdens and result in higher infrastructural costs and thus, in an increasing tax
burden and public expenditures. Furthermore, we expect the share of the population liv-
ing in urban areas to have a positive influence on our dependent variables. With respect to
the demographic structure, we anticipate the working population to have a negative, and
the non-working population to have a positive, impact on tax rates. We have no specific
expectations for the language variable reflecting cultural background, however, as it is com-
mon for non-economists to argue that cultural background drives politics we control for this
influence.
Table 1 presents the data used in our empirical investigation.
3.2. Empirical results
Our theory assumes that stronger institutional competition will lead (ceteris paribus) to a
reduction of the aggregated communal and cantonal tax burden as well as public expendi-
tures. Testing these hypotheses we focus on OLS estimates. However, such estimates could
suffer from simultaneity and omitted variables. Effective institutions are not necessarily
exogenously given, but can be the result of the specific fiscal preferences of the citizens.
Thus, it could be argued that institutions such as powerful independent political units (fi-
nance commissions), direct democratic instruments, and federalism emerge endogenously
and have no direct influence on taxes or expenditures. To address these factors, we also
estimate 2SLS regressions (see Angrist & Krueger, 2001). As instruments we use culture
(language), topography, and urbanity. While Pujol and Weber (2001) show that in Switzer-
land fiscal preferences are correlated with linguistic provenance, it is common for studies
dealing with Swiss datasets to include a language dummy to control for cultural background
(e.g. Feld & Matsusaka, 2003; Feld & Kirchga¨ssner, 2001; Frey & Stutzer, 2000, 2001;
Schaltegger & Feld, 2001). Furthermore, cultural background (language or colonial ori-
gin) is often used in cross-country analysis to instrument institutional features (e.g. Persson
& Tabelini, 2004). We also assume that urbanity and topography could influence fiscal
preferences and therefore, we use them as instruments when statistical requirements are
met.
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3.2.1. Empirical analysis: Tax burden
Table 2 presents the empirical results for the impact of institutional competition on the
aggregate cantonal and local tax burden. Regression 1 is our base regression. Regressions 2
to 6 include additional explanatory variables that may influence our dependent variable. As
we have limited degrees of freedom, we only introduce one additional variable at a time. All
regressions include a dummy variable for the canton of Basle-Town. This canton is an outlier
with respect to its average income, which impacts on our results. When excluding these
observations from our sample the size of the estimated effect of our institutional competition
variable decreases from −9.65 to −7.10. We also estimated each model specification by
deleting one canton after another from the sample. All effects remain statistically significant
with coefficients clustering around −7.1.2
Column 7 provides the results of our 2SLS estimation. Due to omitted variable and simul-
taneity concerns we instrumented our institutional competition variable with three unarguably
exogenous variables: language, urbanity, and topography. While, individually, they are not all
statistically significant in the first stage regression on our institutional competition variable,
they are jointly significant. We observe an increase in our main explanatory variable, but
the tax decreasing effect is confirmed. As the results do not differ much and the institutions
have been in place for quite a long time, endogeneity should not be a big concern. Fur-
thermore, a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test confirms exogeneity of the institutional competition
variable. Thus, OLS should yield consistent estimates. Therefore, we will mainly focus on
the efficient and more conservative OLS estimates.
The results from Table 2 confirm the expected theoretical effects of institutional competi-
tion between the government and an independent political agency. As the dataset relies on a
limited number of observations, it is more difficult to obtain statistically significant results.
In regression 1, the influence of the institutional competition variable on the aggregated can-
tonal and local tax burden is not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant.
A one point increase of the institutional competition variable implies an average reduction of
the tax burden of 7.10 percentage points. Since the institutional competition variable ranges
from 0 to 3 a potential difference of roughly 21 percentage points results. Taking into account
that the average tax burden is standardized to 100 percent, the potential effect is very large.
In regressions 2 to 6 the results seem to be robust to the inclusion of additional explanatory
variables and remain statistically significant.3
In contrast to institutional competition, cantonal direct democracy does not exhibit a sta-
tistically significant influence on the aggregated cantonal and local tax burden. At first sight,
this result is not fully in line with the emerging literature on direct democracy which tends
to find beneficial impacts of direct democracy on public finance variables. However, it can
2 The most extreme values result when dropping the observations for the cantons Fribourg and Graubu¨nden.
In the case of Fribourg the size of the coefficient increases to −11.2, in the case of the canton of Graubu¨nden,
it decreases to −5.9. The canton of Fribourg is also interesting for another reason. Its finance commissions
were most difficult to classify. They have no formal right to advance alternative proposals but are allowed to
ponder alternatives. Thus, they regularly develop alternative ideas which then are taken up by a citizen who
formulates them as a formal proposal which has to be voted on. Therefore, we classified the finance commission
index value of Fribourg to be 4. But from a more restrictive perspective one could also argue that a value
of 3 is appropriate. When reclassifying Fribourg accordingly, the coefficient for institutional competition is
(absolutely) increasing to −8.50 with increasing statistical significance.
3 The results including the canton of Basle-town are even stronger. The coefficient is with −9.65 higher and
the standard errors are smaller. Apart from the income variable, no other variable is significantly affected by
the inclusion of the canton of Basle.
Springer
Public Choice (2006) 130:79–98 89
Ta
bl
e
2
Im
pa
ct
o
fi
nd
ep
en
de
nt
an
d
co
m
pe
tin
g
po
lit
ic
al
ag
en
ci
es
o
n
ag
gr
eg
at
e
ta
x
bu
rd
en
O
LS
(T
ax
)
2S
LS
(T
ax
)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7a
In
st
itu
tio
na
l
−7
.1
0
−6
.8
0
−6
.7
7
−6
.9
8
−7
.3
4
−7
.2
1
−9
.8
3
co
m
pe
tit
io
n
(−
2.
23
)∗∗
(−
1.
95
)∗
(−
1.
91
)∗
(−
2.
03
)∗
(−
2.
10
)∗
(−
2.
26
)∗∗
(−
1.
97
)∗
Lo
ca
ld
ire
ct
de
m
oc
ra
cy
5.
95
5.
21
6.
57
6.
59
−2
.3
2
5.
23
10
.2
8
(0.
45
)
(0.
37
)
(0.
46
)
(0.
51
)
(−
0.
14
)
(0.
38
)
(0.
69
)
Ca
nt
on
al
D
ire
ct
−0
.9
3
−1
.1
2
−0
.8
7
−0
.7
4
−0
.3
1
−1
.3
6
−0
.4
3
de
m
oc
ra
cy
(−
0.
30
)
(−
0.
35
)
(−
0.
27
)
(−
0.
23
)
(−
0.
08
)
(−
0.
41
)
(−
0.
12
)
Fe
de
ra
lis
m
−5
.8
4
−5
.2
5
−5
.1
4
−5
.7
4
−6
.3
2
−6
.1
6
−7
.1
0
(−
1.
89
)∗
(−
1.
45
)
(−
1.
49
)
(−
1.
62
)
(−
1.
50
)
(−
1.
78
)∗
(−
2.
03
)∗
In
co
m
e
−1
.0
2E
-3
−1
.0
6E
-3
−1
.1
1E
-3
−1
.0
3E
-3
−0
.9
5E
-3
−1
.0
3E
-3
−0
.8
9E
-3
(−
4.
37
)∗∗
∗
(−
3.
70
)∗∗
∗
(−
3.
28
)∗∗
∗
(−
3.
86
)∗∗
∗
(−
2.
37
)∗∗
(−
4.
24
)∗∗
∗
(−
2.
83
)∗∗
Po
pu
la
tio
n
9.
27
E-
6
9.
05
E-
6
7.
34
E-
6
9.
16
E-
6
13
.2
0E
-6
8.
35
E-
6
10
.0
0E
-6
(1.
81
)∗
(1.
62
)
(1.
43
)
(1.
65
)
(1.
31
)
(1.
40
)
(1.
82
)∗
To
po
gr
ap
hy
–
−0
.1
0
–
–
–
–
–
–
(−
0.
35
)
–
–
–
–
–
U
rb
an
ity
–
–
8.
08
–
–
–
–
–
–
(0.
37
)
–
–
–
–
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
–
–
–
0.
50
–
–
–
–
–
–
(0.
14
)
–
–
–
Yo
u
n
g
–
–
–
–
17
9.
58
–
–
–
–
–
–
(0.
49
)
–
–
O
ld
–
–
–
–
−1
9.
25
–
–
–
–
–
–
(−
0.
10
)
–
–
La
ng
ua
ge
–
–
–
–
–
2.
48
–
–
–
–
–
–
(0.
26
)
–
Co
ns
ta
nt
17
8.
81
17
9.
17
16
8.
40
17
6.
39
14
9.
86
18
1.
29
17
7.
04
(10
.90
)∗∗
∗
(10
.49
)∗∗
∗
(4.
68
)∗∗
∗
(7.
19
)∗∗
∗
(1.
91
)∗
(9.
51
)∗∗
∗
(9.
60
)∗∗
∗
A
dj.
R2
0.
69
6
0.
68
0
0.
68
3
0.
67
9
0.
66
8
0.
68
0
0.
68
0
N
ot
es
:
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
w
ith
ro
bu
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
.
t-
st
at
ist
ic
s
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
le
v
el
:∗
0.
05
<
p
<
0.
1,
∗∗
0.
01
<
p
<
0.
05
,
∗∗
∗ p
<
0.
01
.A
ll
re
gr
es
sio
ns
in
cl
ud
e
a
du
m
m
y
v
ar
ia
bl
e
fo
rt
he
ca
n
to
n
B
as
le
-T
o
w
n
.
(a)
In
st
itu
tio
na
lc
o
m
pe
tit
io
n
is
in
str
um
en
te
d;
Th
e
in
str
um
en
ts
ar
e:
A
ll
re
gr
es
sa
nd
s(
wi
tho
ut
In
st
itu
tio
na
lc
o
m
pe
tit
io
n)
in
cl
ud
in
g
la
ng
ua
ge
,t
op
og
ra
ph
y
an
d
u
rb
an
ity
So
ur
ce
:O
w
n
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
Springer
90 Public Choice (2006) 130:79–98
be easily reconciled with that literature for several reasons: First, most earlier studies did
not focus on the influence of direct democracy on the tax burden but rather on expenditures,
deficits, and debts. Second, earlier studies often focus on cantonal level data only, but not
on the aggregate of local and cantonal data. As we have already argued, studies analyzing
Swiss fiscal institutions should take both levels into account simultaneously because there is
systematic substitution between cantonal and local government activity (Eichenberger, 1994;
Schaltegger, 2001). Third, the influence of the cantonal direct democracy variable is sensitive
to the inclusion of other explanatory variables such as urbanity, demography, share of for-
eigners or unemployment.4 Solely if we exclude all other institutional variables and estimate
cantonal direct democracy together with population and income only, we find statistically
significant negative effects. Forth, earlier studies did not include local direct democracy
measures in their estimates, even though a large portion of fiscal decisions are made at the
local level. As with most other variables, the inclusion of the local direct democracy variable
renders cantonal direct democracy insignificant. However, these two variables are correlated
with 0.63, what might boost the standard errors.5 The correlation between the institutional
competition variable and local as well as cantonal direct democracy is with a 0.48 and 0.39,
respectively, lower and should not cause too many problems. The institutional competition
variable on the other hand is not sensitive to the inclusion of the cantonal direct democracy
variable or any other institutional variable.
Local direct democracy in the form of town meetings does not exhibit significant effects
on the aggregated local and cantonal tax burden. However, this variable is, similar to the
measure of direct democracy at the cantonal level, also sensitive to the inclusion of other
variables.
Federalism exhibits a strong negative and sometimes statistically significant impact on
taxes. For every unit of increasing local autonomy, we estimate an average influence of −5.84
percentage points. Considering a range from 3.2 to 6.1 we observe a potential effect of up to
16.8 percentage points lower tax burden. Thus, local autonomy also seems to be an important
ingredient in lowering taxes. While the size of the coefficient is not much affected by the
inclusion of additional control variables, statistical significance falls below conventional
levels.
Consistent with our expectations, the cantonal income variable exhibits a negative impact
on taxes. The coefficient remains quite stable to changes in the setting and is regularly sta-
tistically significant at least at the 5 percent level. An increase of cantonal income by CHF
1000 implies an average tax reduction of around 1 percentage point. Population size exhibits
only at the margin a statistically significant influence on our dependent variable. Sometimes
it is assumed that population size affects public finance non-linearly. Thus, we also included
the quadratic term of population size into the equation (not reported in Table 2), but the
results remain unchanged. All other variables from regressions 2 to 6 are statistically not sig-
nificantly different from zero. The variable for topography has no statistically significant
explanatory power. This is not surprising, because a great part of extra infrastructural
costs due to topographical conditions are born by the central government and therefore,
do not affect taxes in these regions. Urbanity, the unemployment rate, and demographic
4 See also the dispute between Bodmer (2004) and Kirchga¨ssner (2005).
5 However, when we only include either cantonal or local direct democracy together with the other control
variables in our regression the results for direct democracy do not change much. For instance, when we drop
local direct democracy from our base equation, the coefficient for cantonal direct democracy shifts from −0.93
(t-value −0.30) to −0.17 (−0.05).
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factors exercise no statistically significant influence on the aggregated local and cantonal tax
burden.
3.2.2. Empirical analysis: Public expenditures
Following the same empirical strategy as before, we detect very similar patterns and largely
the same results with respect to public expenditures.
Analogously to the tax estimates, we control for the Canton of Basle-Town. As indi-
cated in Section 3.1., we also have to eliminate the canton of Uri which receives a dispro-
portionate share of federal government grants in order to fulfill its role as a main transit
corridor through the Alps. The respective costs enter the cantonal budget and, thus, af-
fect cantonal expenditures, although they are covered by the federal government. However,
these expenditures do not depend on cantonal institutions. Since the infrastructural expen-
ditures of the other cantons due to topography are also compensated by federal grants and
fiscal equalization, they inflate cantonal expenditures but not taxes. Therefore, we include
topography as a variable into our base regression for public spending but not for the tax
burden.
Regression 1 from Table 3 confirms our hypothesis that a rising influence of the local
independent competitor decreases public expenditures. The coefficient of the institutional
competition variable is statistically significant at the 5 percent level and affects public spend-
ing by a large amount. A one point increase of the institutional competition variable implies
an average reduction of public expenditure of about CHF 810 per capita. The maximum
potential effect of institutional competition (which ranges from 0 to 3) is about CHF 2430
(per capita). Thus, the influence is – similar to the previous results for local and cantonal tax
burden – not only statistically significant but also economically highly relevant. Moreover,
the results are fairly robust to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables in regressions
2 to 5. The result of the 2SLS regression in column 6 reports a higher coefficient but does not
reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Topography could not serve as an instru-
ment as it is a statistically significant explanatory variable in the second stage. Unfortunately,
it was impossible to identify more powerful instruments.
Looking at the remaining institutional variables as well as all the other control variables,
the results look very similar to our findings for the tax burden. Local direct democracy and
cantonal direct democracy do not have a significant influence on public spending in our
baseline regressions. However, the respective democracy variables yield significant results
if they are included separately into the estimates and are solely combined with the baseline
controls population, income and topography. The simultaneous inclusion of the two variables
for direct democracy at the cantonal and at the local level, respectively, produces insignificant
results.6 The institutional competition variable however, is not much affected by such changes
and yields consistent results.
Federalism exhibits a negative and statistically significant influence on public expen-
ditures. For every one point increase of the federalism index, we measure an average ex-
penditure reduction of CHF 1160. Analogous to our tax regressions, the income variable
has a statistically and economically significant negative impact on public expenditures. As
discussed earlier, the variable for topography exhibits a positive and significant influence
6 When we drop local direct democracy from our base equation the size as well as the t-value of cantonal
direct democracy increase but the coefficient remains statistically insignificant.
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on public spending. These estimates parallel our findings reported in Table 2 and are
fairly robust to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables in regressions 2 through
5. All other explanatory variable do not have a statistically significant influence on public
expenditures.
3.2.3. Robustness issues
To further investigate the robustness of our results, we estimated different equation specifica-
tions. As reported earlier, we included and excluded insignificant variables and examined pos-
sible outlier effects. Again, the coefficient of the institutional competition variable remained
unchallenged. We also included alternative measures for the extent of direct democracy such
as a sub-index on the financial referendum from the index proposed by Frey and Stutzer
(2000, 2001) and an index provided by Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996) which
measures whether the population can decide on the tax rate and the budget. The results
remained widely unchanged.
To make sure these results are not only valid for a specific year or constellation, we also
investigate the relationships for other years. However, institutions almost by definition re-
main stable over time. This is also true for our institutional competition variable, which does
not exhibit much variation. Consequently, a panel regression is no strict test.7 Therefore, we
estimate the respective equations for several years separately. For reasons of data limitation
we consider the period between 1995 and 1999. We analyze the data in the same way as pre-
sented earlier in this paper and find essentially the same results (See Table A1 in Appendix A
for a short overview of these results). The coefficient for the influence of institutional com-
petition always remains economically relevant and statistically significant. Thus, the institu-
tional competition variable seems to be robust to the inclusion of other explanatory variables
as well as to changes of the empirical setting and also yields consistent results for other
years.
4. Conclusion and outlook for future research
Consistent with our theory, institutional competition between government and an independent
political unit seem to have an important influence on public finance. Communal finance
commissions with encompassing control and proposal rights exercise a statistically significant
and economically relevant negative effect on the aggregated local and cantonal tax burden as
well as public expenditure.
An important form of political competition has been neglected so far in the economic
literature: institutionalized competition between government and an independent political
unit. We discuss how this form of competition works in a system of direct democracy and
provide empirical evidence for its beneficial effects on public finance. At the Swiss local level
we can observe institutional competition between communal governments and communal
finance commissions in municipalities with town meeting. After constructing an index, which
maps the institutional design of these local finance commissions, we estimate the influence
of institutional competition in a system of direct democracy. Despite the limited number
7 When the data panel for 1995–1999 is used to estimate a random effects model, the results become even
stronger due to the larger sample size.
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of observations, we find statistically significant and economically relevant negative effects
on the local and cantonal tax burden as well as public expenditures. The magnitude of the
estimated coefficient seems to be robust to changes in the equation specification. As the
present dataset is very small, future research must address this issue with larger datasets at
the local level.
So far, our results refer to the Swiss local level with its direct democracy. However,
political inefficiency is even more pervasive in representative democracy (Feld & Matsusaka,
2003), where pork-barrel politics as well as log-rolling at the expense of weakly organized
interest groups are widely known phenomena (e.g. Mueller, 2003; Persson & Tabellini,
2000). Thus, we intend to analyze how institutionalized competition can be established in
a representative-democratic environment. In some major Swiss cities (e.g. Zug and Olten)
with parliaments, this is already the case. There, the financial commission is directly elected
by the citizens and is an independent agency which competes with the government as well
as the parliament. However, these units may only perform ex post audits of the accounts,
similar to audit courts and do not have encompassing audit and amendment rights. These
examples show that independently elected institutions are also feasible at the parliamentary
level.
Another field, where such independent and competing institutions have been neglected,
is the corporate governance literature. Analogously to town meetings in political systems,
shareholder meetings face similar problems. Information asymmetries between the board
of directors and the shareholders are serious issues and may be addressed in analogy to
our investigation. Firstly, corporate auditing firms must be able to apply freely for a limited
mandate as the firm’s corporate auditor directly at the shareholder meeting. There, the share-
holders may choose among different auditing firms. Secondly, at the shareholder meeting,
the corporate auditor needs to have encompassing proposal rights on strategic questions of
the corporate policy as well as on individual projects. Analogous to our reasoning in political
systems, such institutionalized competition may alter the incentives for the executive board
to cater for shareholder interests.
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Appendix A
See Table A1 on next page.
Appendix B
Table B1 provides information on the competences of financial commissions at the Swiss
local level in municipalities with town meeting, the aggregated finance commission index
per canton, the prevalence of town meetings (share of population living in municipalities
with town meeting) as well as the product of the two indices, the institutional competition
variable.
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